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David J. Bier

The United States hit a new record of about 8.3 million immigrants at various stages in its family‐​sponsored permanent residence process in 2022—an increase of nearly 1 million since 2019. The staggering number of pending cases is primarily the result of outdated caps on green cards, but processing delays are also affecting a substantial number of applicants.

The U.S. immigration system’s current caps came into effect in fiscal year 1992. Figure 1 breaks down the family‐​based backlog into its two main categories: immediate relatives (“uncapped”) and family preference immigrants (“capped”) from 1992 to 2022. Immediate relatives—spouses, minor children, and parents of adult U.S. citizens—have no direct cap (though their admissions reduce the cap for the family preference (or capped) immigrants from 480,000 to 226,000). The immediate relative backlog has increased from about 73,000 in 1992 to over 1 million in 2022.

Family preference immigrants are spouses and children of legal permanent residents, adult children of U.S. citizens, and siblings of adult U.S. citizens, as well as any spouses and minor children of those relatives. Immigrants who need a cap number available to apply for a green card made up about 86 percent of the family‐​based backlog in 2022. From 1992 to 2022, the number of capped family‐​sponsored immigrants stuck in the backlog increased from about 3.3 million to about 7.1 million. The cap is set at 226,000 annually.

These estimates differ significantly from the most commonly referenced source for information on the family‐​sponsored green card backlog: the State Department’s annual immigrant visa waiting list report. The numbers from that report are shown in orange (Petition Approved‐​Wait Listed (Abroad)), but that report does not include several groups of applicants. It excludes the “immediate relative” or uncapped categories, anyone waiting to apply inside the United States, and—most importantly—anyone whose petition is yet to be adjudicated. As Figure 2 shows, 3.6 million had a sponsor’s petition pending. This massive backlog in pending petitions is largely because of the government’s correct view that it shouldn’t waste resources adjudicating applications that will not result in a green card being issued thanks to the cap.

The overall cap is set at 226,000, but it is divided into 5 categories based on the immigrant’s marital status and relationship to the U.S. sponsor:

F‑1—Married adult children of U.S. citizens: 23,400
F‑2A—Spouses and minor children of legal permanent residents: ~87,900
F‑2B—Unmarried adult children of legal permanent residents: ~26,300
F‑3—Unmarried adult children of U.S. citizens: 23,400
F‑4—Siblings of U.S. citizens: 65,000

In addition, immigrants from each country have a separate limit. No single birthplace can receive more than 7 percent of the green cards, though 75 percent of the F‑2A category aren’t counted against the cap.

As a result of the country caps and category caps, applicants face wildly different potential wait times: anywhere from 6 years to 233 years (effectively infinite). As seen in Table 1, the odds of a new family‐​sponsor surviving to be able to act as a sponsor when a green card is available under the cap is low in many category‐​country combinations. Virtually all new sponsors from Mexico in 2022—outside the F‑2A category—will die before their family member receives a green card. In fact, nearly 40 percent of all new sponsors in 2022 and 58 percent of sponsors in non‐​F‐​2A categories will die before their relatives get to immigrate. Even if the sponsor survives for eternity, about 1.6 million immigrants currently in the backlog will die before receiving a green card.

Even the shortest wait for F‑2A category—for spouses and minor children of green card holders—is unconscionable. 6 to 10 years to wait to be with your nuclear family? This would be unimaginable in nearly all developed democracies. The United States stands apart in having some of the most restrictive immigration laws among wealthy countries.

Patrick G. Eddington

For years, now former President Donald Trump and his key supporters have claimed the FBI’s investigation into his alleged collusion with Russian officials in order to influence the outcome of the 2016 election–internally known at the FBI as CROSSFIRE HURRICANE–was a hoax. Yesterday, Mr. Trump got some validation for his claim.

Late on the afternoon of May 15, Attorney General Merrick Garland released, in nearly unredacted form, the final report of Special Counsel John Durham. Durham’s “investigation of the investigation” was authorized on October 19, 2020, by then‐​Attorney General William Barr.

Under the mandate he received, Durham was authorized to investigate whether any “federal official, employee, or any other person or entity violated the law in connection with the intelligence, counter‐​intelligence, or law‐​enforcement activities directed at the 2016 presidential campaigns, individuals associated with those campaigns, and individuals associated with the administration of President Donald J. Trump, including but not limited to Crossfire Hurricane and the investigation of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III.” (Durham Report, p. 2)

So what did Durham find?

With respect to evidence of collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia, Durham found that before the initial receipt by FBI Headquarters of information from Australia on July 28, 2016, “the government possessed no verified intelligence reflecting that Trump or the Trump campaign was involved in a conspiracy or collaborative relationship with officials of the Russian government…neither U.S. law enforcement nor the Intelligence Community appears to have possessed any actual evidence of collusion in their holdings at the commencement of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation.” (p. 8)

Durham cited two key FBI officials as being responsible for getting the dubious CROSSFIRE HURRICANE investigation started:

“In particular, at the direction of Deputy Director Andrew McCabe, Deputy Assistant Director for Counterintelligence Peter Strzok opened Crossfire Hurricane immediately. Strzok, at a minimum, had pronounced hostile feelings toward Trump. The matter was opened as a full investigation without ever having spoken to the persons who provided the information. Further, the FBI did so without (1) any significant review of its own intelligence databases, (2) collection and examination of any relevant intelligence from other U.S. intelligence entities, (3) interviews of witnesses essential to understand the raw information it had received or (4) using any of the standard analytical tools typically employed by the FBI in evaluating raw intelligence. Had it done so…the FBI would have learned that their own experienced Russia analysts had no information about Trump being involved with Russian leadership officials, nor were others in sensitive positions at the CIA, the NSA, and the Department of State aware of such evidence concerning the subject. In addition, FBI records prepared by Strzok in February and March 2017 show that at the time of the opening of Crossfire Hurricane, the FBI had no information in its holdings indicating that at any time during the campaign anyone in the Trump campaign had been in contact with any Russian intelligence officials.” (p. 9)

For Durham, the evidence of bias in the FBI’s approaches to the Clinton and Trump campaign investigations was clear and unmistakable:

“The speed and manner in which the FBI opened and investigated Crossfire Hurricane during the presidential election season based on raw, unanalyzed, and uncorroborated intelligence also reflected a noticeable departure from how it approached prior matters involving possible attempted foreign election interference plans aimed at the Clinton campaign. As described in Section IV.B, in the eighteen months leading up to the 2016 election, the FBI was required to deal with a number of proposed investigations that had the potential of affecting the election. In each of those instances, the FBI moved with considerable caution. In one such matter… FBI Headquarters and Department officials required defensive briefings to be provided to Clinton and other officials or candidates who appeared to be the targets of foreign interference. In another, the FBI elected to end an investigation after one of its longtime and valuable CHSs went beyond what was authorized and made an improper and possibly illegal financial contribution to the Clinton campaign on behalf of a foreign entity as a precursor to a much larger donation being contemplated.” (pp. 9–10)

And with respect to “…highly significant intelligence it received from a trusted foreign source pointing to a Clinton campaign plan to vilify Trump by tying him to Vladimir Putin so as to divert attention from her own concerns relating to her use of a private email server…”:

“Unlike the FBI’s opening of a full investigation of unknown members of the Trump campaign based on raw, uncorroborated information, in this separate matter involving a purported Clinton campaign plan, the FBI never opened any type of inquiry, issued any taskings, employed any analytical personnel, or produced any analytical products in connection with the information. This lack of action was despite the fact that the significance of the Clinton plan intelligence was such as to have prompted the Director of the CIA to brief the President, Vice President, Attorney General, Director of the FBI, and other senior government officials about its content within days of its receipt. It was also of enough importance for the CIA to send a formal written referral memorandum to Director Comey and the Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division, Peter Strzok, for their consideration and action.” (p. 10)

Regarding the sensational dossier of alleged Trump misconduct and ties to Russian officials, supplied to the U.S. government by former U.K. intelligence officer Christopher Steele, Durham found no corroboration for any of Steele’s claims:

“Our investigation determined that the Crossfire Hurricane investigators did not and could not corroborate any of the substantive allegations contained in the Steele reporting. Nor was Steele able to produce corroboration for any of the reported allegations, even after being offered $1 million or more by the FBI for such corroboration.” (p. 11)

Durham’s critics will no doubt point out that of the three actual criminal cases he brought against key figures in this case, he secured a plea bargain in only one–that of FBI attorney Kevin Clinesmith, who pled guilty to altering a document submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) in connection with a FISA application on Trump associate Carter Page. Clinesmith got 12‐​months’ probation (p. 232).

But on this, the critics miss a key point: The other two defendants–Russian national and Steele sub‐​source Igor Danchenko and Perkins Coie attorney and Clinton campaign opposition researcher Michael Sussmann–were acquitted during jury trials on charges of making false statements to investigators. Those were not defeats for Durham, they were vindications of the American jury trial system, a system in which prosecutors are supposed to be forced to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. They represent a rare but welcome departure from the usual practice by DoJ prosecutors: coercive plea bargains.

So what are the key takeaways from the Durham Report?

The best‐​case interpretation is that a handful of clearly anti‐​Trump FBI agents and lawyers, suffering from a severe case of confirmation bias, managed to open and steer a totally unfounded counterintelligence investigation against an American presidential candidate and his campaign. The worst‐​case interpretation is that the senior most FBI leadership was at least tacitly okay with that approach, while proceeding far more cautiously and carefully with an investigation into his chief political opponent.

The flagrantly disparate treatment of the Trump and Clinton investigations from legal, policy, and procedural standpoints is further evidence of the bias.

Durham’s reform proposals don’t begin to get at the core problem his own investigation uncovered. Durham suggests that “to provide additional scrutiny of politically sensitive investigations would be to identify, in advance, an official who is responsible for challenging the steps taken in the investigation. [Former NSA General Counsel] Stewart Baker proposes having a ‘career position for a nonpartisan FBI agent or lawyer to challenge the FISA application and every other stage of the investigation.’ ”(p. 306)

In fact, this is exactly the role federal courts are supposed to play: providing a real check and challenge to Executive branch prosecutors and the evidence they bring seeking warrants to investigate or indictments to charge people. The failure here is with the FISC and its proclivity–like nearly all federal courts–to show a ludicrous level of deference to executive branch claims brought before them. They key reform here is for the Senate to stop confirming so many executive branch advocates to the federal bench.

Finally, the fallout from this will not just be political, but potentially legal as well. The existing federal investigations into Trump’s culpability for the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot, as well as his alleged theft of hundreds of classified documents upon leaving office, will be viewed by his supporters and perhaps other Americans as nothing more than the continuation of the FBI’s vendetta against Trump–no matter how compelling and well‐​grounded any evidence against him may be.

That House and Senate overseers of the FBI have for decades ignored complaints from civil society organizations about FBI surveillance and investigative overreach is a key reason why we face this new crisis.

David J. Bier

Thanks to lower childbirth rates among the U.S. population, fewer workers are starting their careers each year than during the period following World War II. This phenomenon has made immigration much more important in counteracting workforce decline in the United States. In fact, from 1995 to 2022, immigrants and their children accounted for 70 percent of all civilian labor force growth.

From 1995 to 2022, the U.S. labor force increased from nearly 131.6 million workers to over 164.3 million—an increase of nearly 32.8 million workers: 16.1 million of that increase came from immigrant workers (49 percent) and 6.7 million were children of immigrants (21 percent), according to data from the Current Population Survey’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Just 9.9 million were U.S.-born citizens without a foreign‐​born parent. The actual effect of cutting off all immigration would have been even greater since the working immigrant population would have declined without more immigration by about 4.5 million.

Immigrants have increased from about 10 percent of the U.S. labor force in 1995 to 18 percent in 2022, and immigrants and their children have gone from 18 percent to 29 percent. The total population of immigrant workers or workers with immigrant parents increased from about 23 million to nearly 46 million, making this population a massive contributor to U.S. economic growth.

Despite the increased importance of immigration, however, the U.S. labor force growth has declined. It is just not true that immigration has meant that U.S. workers are facing more competition from new workers. In fact, immigrants are only partially offsetting the significant decline in new U.S. workers entering the workforce. The labor force growth rate fell from 1.7 percent in the 1960s to 0.6 percent in the 2010s—a decline of more than 60 percent.

Of course, some commentators respond that overall labor force growth is not as important as the labor force growth rate for non‐​college educated workers who are more likely to be competing with immigrants. But the rate of growth for non‐​college educated workers is both lower and declines faster over the entire period from 1960 to 2022 than the rate of growth for all workers. Immigrants are even more important in filling these low‐​skilled jobs precisely because U.S. workers are entering them at the lowest rates ever. In fact, college‐​educated workers have accounted for 95 percent of labor force growth from 1992 to 2022.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts that about 70 percent of jobs in 2031 will not require a college degree, and that most job growth from 2021 to 2031 will come from these lower‐​skilled positions. Right now, there are about 9 million job openings, and the U.S. government should stop interfering into the labor market to create shortages. The United States needs workers now more than ever.

Marc Joffe

Given the steep population decline Puerto Rico has experienced, policymakers should reconsider whether remaining residents can continue to support 78 separate municipios. Consolidating some of these governments could result in more efficient service provision and reduced administrative overhead.

Puerto Rico’s population has declined 15% since the 2000 Census, but the rate of population change has varied widely across municipios. Seven municipios registered population increases between 2000 and 2021, while twenty suffered declines of 20% or more.

Smaller municipios that have experienced proportionally large population declines are especially prone to service insolvency, a condition under which the government continues to pay its bills but lacks the ability to provide public services at the level residents might reasonably expect.

The municipio that suffered the largest population decline since 2000 is Guánica—on the island’s southern coast, 45km west of the city of Ponce. Its 2022 population of 12,800 is down 41.5% since the century began. Aside from the challenges faced by other southern coastal communities hard hit by hurricanes and earthquakes in recent years, Guánica is also struggling with chemical contamination in and around its bay.

The municipal government appears to lack the capacity to provide adequate public services under these difficult conditions. According to its latest available federal Single Audit, 65% of Guánica’s spending was devoted to general administration, dwarfing the amounts spent on public safety, public works, and health and welfare, which together accounted for only 10% of total spending.

The Single Audit for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2020, shows that Guánica is heavily indebted and in fiscal distress. Long‐​term liabilities amounted to over $1100 per resident, and the muncipio’s general fund has a negative balance. Guánica’s balance sheet is likely worse than reported because damage to Guánica ‘s capital assets from hurricanes and earthquakes had not been assessed. This issue caused Guánica’s auditor to issue a “adverse” opinion, meaning that its financial statements cannot be relied upon to determine the municipio’s true financial condition. The fact that Guánica’s fiscal year 2021 financial statements are not yet available is another indication of its financial challenges.

With all that in mind, it is worth noting that Guánica and other struggling municipios may show better financial results in fiscal year 2022 due to the American Rescue Plan Act, which provided $1.5 billion in aid to Puerto Rico’s local governments. But that is a one‐​time windfall that cannot resolve long‐​term financial issues.

Although Puerto Rico’s Financial Oversight and Management Board (FOMB) has noted issues with municipio performance, it has stopped short of advocating consolidation. In a recent essay, FOMB Research Director Arnaldo Cruz identified a variety of problems afflicting municipal governments, including failure to meet budgetary revenue targets, borrowing to cover operational expenses, inability to complete capital projects, and procurement irregularities.

Cruz recommended regionalizing individual government services. For example, several municipios could participate in one regional authority that would provide public works services. These regional service providers would be similar to the Joint Powers Authorities that operate in California and some other states.

Although regional service providers could reduce municipal expenditures through economies of scale, they would not address the administrative bureaucracy that manages each municipio. It is only through full consolidation that redundant mayors, municipal legislatures, and support staff can be addressed.

Another challenge to regionalization of the kind recommended by the Oversight Board is lack of take‐​up. In 2020, the Oversight Board announced a Municipal Consolidation Fund for the purpose of providing one‐​time grants to municipios that voluntarily participate in service consolidations. But, according to a recent Commonwealth fiscal plan, the Oversight Board’s Municipal Consolidation Fund had yet to make any grants as of April 2023, despite the Board earmarking $22 million annually for this fund.

From a political standpoint, combining municipio governments is undoubtedly a heavy lift. Mayors, municipal legislators, staff, and suppliers all have an interest in protecting existing bureaucracies and know how to affect the policy debate. Regular Puerto Rico citizens and federal taxpayers who bear the costs of duplicative government structures, individually, pay too little for this inefficiency to be a salient issue. If Puerto Rico is to gain the benefits of municipal consolidation, good government advocates will have to push the idea forward.

Nicholas Anthony

Late last year, the Nigerian government caused a cash shortage for the country’s 200 million citizens that led to protests, riots, and unrest. Since then, the Central Bank of Nigeria proudly announced that the adoption of the eNaira—Nigeria’s central bank digital currency (CBDC)—has increased twelvefold from 0.5 percent to 6 percent of the population.

Godwin Emefiele, the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, said, “The eNaira has emerged as the electronic payment channel of choice for financial inclusion and executing social interventions.”

Whether an adoption rate of 6 percent is a success can be debated, but there should be no misunderstanding that the eNaira was not adopted by choice. At best, it gained adoption due to desperation in the wake of the cash shortage that the government created.

Governor Emefiele has been clear that, “The destination, as far as I am concerned, is to achieve a 100% cashless economy in Nigeria.” But make no mistake, while a cashless economy may be the choice that the Nigerian government has made, it is not a choice that Nigerian citizens have been free to make.

Romina Boccia

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) just released an update to its 10‐​year fiscal projections. CBO highlights higher inflation, lower revenues, and higher spending than previously projected.

CBO’s report arrives as the debate over the debt ceiling heats up in light of an early June deadline. House Republicans passed their opening bid to raise the debt ceiling by $1.5 trillion or through March 2024, whichever comes first. The Limit, Save, Grow Act would save $4.8 trillion, reducing the 10‐​year spending total by 6 percent. So far, President Biden and most Congressional Democrats have refused to negotiate, demanding a so‐​called clean debt ceiling increase—despite strong precedent in U.S. history for pairing debt limit increases with policy reforms to address rising debt. According to Secretary of Treasury Janet Yellen, federal borrowing authority could run out by June 1.

Lawmakers ought to heed the CBO’s latest update. The responsible choice is to raise the debt limit in combination with fiscal reforms that begin to stabilize federal debt as a percentage of GDP (gross domestic product). A Better Budget Control Act which enforces a single, total limit on discretionary spending, accounts and pays for emergency spending, and sets up an independent nonpartisan commission to reform Medicare and Social Security would allow Congress to responsibly raise the dollar‐​denominated debt limit without further inflating the public debt as a share of the economy.

The following are the key trends outlined in CBO’s report:

Debt will grow to 119 percent of GDP

Federal publicly held debt (the debt the United States has borrowed from credit markets) is currently $24.6 trillion. As a percentage of the country’s yearly economic output, public debt will be 98.2 percent of GDP by the end of 2023. By 2028, public debt will surpass its all‐​time World War II high of 106 percent of GDP. By 2033, public debt will rise to 118.9 percent of GDP. See the CBO graph above for historical context and additional longer‐​term debt projections. That’s about 0.6 percent or 264 billion more than CBO projected just three months earlier.

According to a recent paper published by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), CBO may be underestimating the potential growth in debt, deficits, and spending. CBO assumes that many key variables, such as real interest rates, health care cost, and economic growth, will continue based on past trends. Under AEI’s alternative projection, “these variables are outcomes produced by supply and demand, based on logical functional forms and deep parameter estimates from the literature or empirical analysis.” Their model results in the debt‐​to‐​GDP ratio reaching 132 percent by 2032.

High and rising debt slows economic growth, increases interest rates, and crowds out private investment. These negative economic effects will only worsen as the United States’ fiscal trajectory deteriorates. If the United States continues to unsustainably accumulate debt, it raises the risk of a sudden fiscal crisis where bond holders lose confidence in the federal government’s ability or willingness to service debt without inflating away the debt’s value by reducing the purchasing power of the national currency.

Rising entitlement spending is the main cause of widening deficits

In 2022, the budget deficit was $1.4 trillion, about $340 billion more than CBO originally projected. The difference can primarily be attributed to the Biden administration’s costly student debt relief policy. The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget now puts the total cost of Biden’s student loan policies at $970 billion. This includes student debt policies implemented or proposed since the pandemic, such as “$400 billion from debt cancellation, $230 billion from the Administration’s new IDR program, nearly $200 billion from the student debt pause, and almost $150 billion from a variety of other actions,” according to Marc Goldwein. CBO projects the deficit to continue to widen to an average $2 trillion or 6.1 percent of the GDP over the 2024 to 2033 period. The average non‐​crisis deficit, post‐​Great recession and pre‐​pandemic, was about 4 percent of GDP.

Elevated spending is the root cause of increasing deficits. While emergency pandemic spending and student loan policies have driven recent deficit increases, CBO expects major entitlements including Social Security and federal health care programs to be responsible for the lion’s share of future spending. From 2023 to 2033, Social Security spending will grow from $1.3 trillion to $2.4 trillion, an increase of 85 percent. Major health care programs, including Medicare and Medicaid, will grow from $1.7 trillion to $3.1 trillion over the same period. Combined, major entitlements will be responsible for 60 percent of total spending growth over the next 10 years. In total, the 10‐​year projected cost of major entitlements has risen by $153 billion since CBO’s February report.

Rising interest costs worsen fiscal outlook

As the government borrows more, interest costs will rise. This borrowing cost, expressed as net interest cost in the budget, is the second largest driver of rising spending after major entitlements. This year, CBO projects net interest costs to total $640 billion, consuming 13 percent of federal revenues for 2023. In just 10 years, net interest costs are projected to reach $1.4 trillion, consuming 20 percent of federal revenues for 2033. For context, interest costs will exceed total annual discretionary defense spending by 2028 and nondefense discretionary spending by 2031. Compared to CBO’s February projections, 10‐​year interest costs have risen by $131 billion due to increases in the actual rates paid on recently issued Treasury securities and an increase in expected 10‐​year deficit spending. Were interest rates 1 percentage point higher than currently projected interest costs would rise to nearly $2 trillion by 2033, for a cumulative interest cost increase of $3 trillion over 10 years.

In addition to putting the United States deeper in the hole, rising interest costs could place budgetary constraints on Congress. As interest costs consume a larger share of federal revenues, legislators will have fewer taxpayer dollars remaining to fund other critical spending priorities like defense.

Economic trends worsen while spending increases

CBO projects higher inflation than it did in February, increasing its projections of net interest spending by $131 billion over the 2023 to 2033 period. CBO also reduced its short‐​term projections for government revenue and economic output to reflect lower economic growth. In April of this year alone, the government collected $250 billion less in taxes than expected. One major uncertainty is the President’s student loan policy, currently under review by the Supreme Court. Biden’s proposed income‐​driven repayment plan for student loans would add $111 billion to deficit spending over the next decade — this policy was not included in CBO’s latest outlook. However, if the Supreme Court rules against President Biden’s student loan debt forgiveness, this could reduce deficits by $400 billion over the next decade. In total, net spending projections for 2023 to 2033 increased by $234 billion.

Fiscal guardrails can create a sustainable fiscal future

CBO’s updated baseline projections should give lawmakers across the political spectrum cause for concern. High and rising public debt increases the risk of a sudden fiscal crisis, constrains the government’s ability to respond to unforeseen emergencies, and slows economic growth. In the last three months alone, the fiscal and economic outlook has changed enough to warrant worsened 10‐​year budgetary projections. CBO’s revised projections may still be too optimistic. CBO does not account for the possibility of a major military conflict, financial crisis, or public health emergency over the next decade. Any of these crisis events could significantly increase spending, widen deficits, and further add to the public debt.

Congress and the President ought to consider a Better Budget Control Act to reduce inflationary pressures and limit the risk of a future fiscal crisis. New limits on discretionary spending, immediate reductions to mandatory programs, and future savings from reforms to Medicare and Social Security put forth by an independent commission can stabilize the federal debt, by saving at least $8 trillion over the next 10 years. Such an agreement would signal to markets that the federal government intends to be a sound fiscal steward, which would enhance confidence in U.S. policymaking. Greater confidence would boost economic growth and American incomes. By reducing uncertainty over future tax increases and inflation, Congress can unleash greater investment.

Legislators should work together to avoid a future fiscal crisis by reducing spending and adopting prudent budgetary reforms as they confront the debt limit this year.

Walter Olson

The Supreme Court has ruled that California may prohibit the in‐​state sale of pork raised out of state by methods it deems inhumane, rejecting a constitutional challenge raised by pork producers who had argued that the law would badly disrupt the economies of other states. In so doing the Court appears to have significantly whittled down the scope of the so‐​called Dormant Commerce Clause, a clause that has been drawn skepticism from Justices including the late Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Neil Gorsuch. While the new decision is a complex one with multiple opinions, it appears to give the green light to a wide array of state environmental and consumer regulations that may inflict significant economic harm on other states but do not discriminate between in‐​state and out‐​of‐​state producers.

Cato had filed a brief urging the Court to grant review in this case to bring some clarity to the application of the Dormant Commerce Clause, given the highly interstate nature of the market— almost all pork Californians consume is produced in other states—and the substantial burdens of the measure, which include the prospect that California agricultural agents will travel around the country to ensure that farmers in other states comply with California law. Ilya Shapiro, writing with Frank Garrison in 2017, described the clause as “the idea that states can’t impose regulations that impede interstate commerce even if Congress hasn’t expressly forbidden them to do so.…While the commerce clause has been invoked since the New Deal as a warrant for nearly unlimited federal power, its inverse actually seems more faithful to a founding document concerned with the free flow of commerce throughout the nation.”

As Jonathan Adler writes, “the decision complicates the already questionable ‘Roberts Court is pro‐​business’ narrative, by demonstrating (yet again) that when conservative jurisprudential commitments conflict with corporate interests, the former prevail. Combined with decisions such as Virginia Uranium v. Warren, National Pork Producers shows that business groups cannot depend on conservative justices to support their challenges to state regulations.”

And a comment from Jeff Kosseff: “Until yesterday, I had been somewhat optimistic about using the Dormant Commerce Clause to avoid a state‐​by‐​state patchwork of internet laws. But the National Pork Producers opinion has pretty much eliminated that optimism.”

Cato has filed briefs in Dormant Commerce Clause cases involving state rental car taxes calculated to burden out‐​of‐​staters, Colorado’s attempt to regulate how power imported from out of state is generated, and Tennessee’s attempt to reserve the issuance of liquor licenses to those who have lived in the state for a long time.

Colin Grabow

ReasonTV and parody musician Remy have teamed up on a new video poking fun at the Jones Act, and the result is nothing short of hilarious:

Taking its inspiration from the Beastie Boys’ 1994 song Sabotage, the ReasonTV/​Remy video features a Canadian‐​flagged tanker attempting to transport supplies from Florida to Puerto Rico in the wake of a hurricane. Blocking the tanker’s ability to offload its precious cargo, of course, is the Jones Act, the 1920 protectionist shipping law that restricts domestic waterborne transportation—such as between Florida and Puerto Rico—to vessels that are U.S.-flagged, U.S.-built, and mostly owned and crewed by American citizens. Tankers (or any other type of vessel) registered outside the United States—or American‐​flagged but simply built in a foreign country—are only allowed to transport supplies to U.S. ports if their cargo was loaded abroad.

Although a brilliant bit of comedy, the video brings to mind the absurd situation that occurred last year following Hurricane Fiona when a foreign‐​flagged tanker sailing from Texas to Amsterdam attempted to unload its cargo of diesel fuel—needed for generators in the midst of widespread power outages—in Puerto Rico. Initially unable to do so because of the Jones Act, the tanker finally received a waiver from the law following heavy pressure on the Biden administration.

That’s the good news.

Unfortunately, lobbyists from pro‐​Jones Act groups responded by inserting language in last year’s National Defense Authorization Act that placed new restrictions on waivers of the 1920 law. Among the changes to the waiver process were a prohibition on waivers for vessels already carrying cargo—such as ReasonTV’s hypothetical Canadian‐​flagged tanker laden with supplies from Florida—as well as a requirement that waivers be granted no earlier than 48 hours after a waiver request is published. Under these restrictions, the foreign‐​flagged tanker that delivered diesel fuel to Puerto Rico last year would be ineligible for a Jones Act waiver.

ReasonTV and Remy have produced a deeply funny video, but the costs and consequences of this law are certainly no laughing matter.

Jeffrey Miron

This article appeared on SubStack on May 12, 2023.

Unless Congress cuts spending or raises taxes in the near future, the federal government will hit its debt ceiling later this summer. At that point the United States will either default or pursue “extraordinary measures,” such as minting a trillion dollar coin.

President Biden wants a “clean” increase in the ceiling; Republicans want a substantial cut in spending in exchange for raising the limit. In all likelihood, the two sides will appear to make no progress until the last second before default; they will then jointly announce a compromise that both sides portray as victory.

My view is that the United States should eliminate the debt ceiling entirely.

The potential benefit of a ceiling is that it might restrain spending. The U.S. fiscal situation is on a path to insolvency, and slowing expenditure growth—not raising taxes—is the only effective way to address this issue.

Yet it seems unlikely that “process reforms” like debt limits will restrain spending. During recent negotiations, both sides ruled out cuts to Social Security or Medicare, even though these programs are the most important causes of excess expenditure growth.

The debt ceiling, moreover, has downsides. At a minimum, it generates unneeded uncertainty every few years whenever the debt gets close to the limit.

Worse, the ceiling distracts attention from the fundamental question: how can the United States reconcile its limited ability to pay for entitlement spending with the much greater promises it has made for such spending.

Until the nation grapples with that issue, the debt limit is a sideshow. And if the country adopts an affordable path for entitlements, a debt limit is unnecessary.

Colleen Hroncich

My oldest child is graduating from college tomorrow, so it has me thinking about our educational journey—which could best be described as eclectic. At various times, we used private school, district school, and cyber charter school. But we ultimately landed on homeschooling. That doesn’t mean they were literally learning at home every day. My kids participated in co‐​ops, hybrid classes, dual enrollment, athletics, and more. This gave them access to experts and plenty of social time.

It can be scary taking charge of your children’s education—I remember feeling very relieved when my oldest received her first college acceptance. But today there are more resources than you can imagine to help you create the best education plan for your children’s individual needs and interests. And with the growth of education entrepreneurship, the situation is getting even better.

For starters, you don’t have to go it alone. The growth of microschools and hybrid schools means there are flexible learning options in many areas that previously had none. One goal of the Friday Feature is to help parents see the diversity of educational options that exist. To see what’s available in your area, you can search online, check with friends and neighbors, or connect with a local homeschool group.

If you don’t find what you’re looking for, the good news is that there’s also more support for people looking to start new learning entities. The National Microschooling Center is a great starting place if you’re considering creating your own microschool. The National Hybrid Schools Project at Kennesaw State University is also a tremendous resource. There are businesses—like Microschool Builders and Teacher, Let Your Light Shine—whose focus is helping people navigate the path to education entrepreneurship. And grant opportunities, like VELA and Yass Prize, can help with funding.

We were fortunate to be in an area with a strong homeschool community and therefore had plenty of activities to choose from. But I’m still a bit jealous when I speak to parents and teachers each week and hear about the amazing educational environments they’ve created.

There’s also an abundance of online resources available, from full online schools to à la carte classes in every subject imaginable. If you like online classes but want an in‐​person component, KaiPod Learning might be just the ticket. These are flexible learning centers where kids can bring whatever curriculum they’re using and work with support from a KaiPod learning coach. There are daily enrichment activities, like art, music, and coding, as well as social time.

One of the best parts of taking charge of your children’s education is that it puts you in the driver’s seat. If your children are advanced in particular subjects, they can push forward at their own pace. In areas where they struggle, they can take their time and be sure they understand before moving ahead. (One potential downside is that this takes extra discipline and can be challenging. But it’s tremendously beneficial overall.)

These nonconventional learning paths can be great for kids who don’t want to go to college, too. Flexible schedules free up time to pursue a trade, music, performing arts, sports, agriculture, and more. As kids get older, they can increasingly take charge of their own education. This lends itself to developing an entrepreneurial outlook, which is vitally important in a world where technology and public policy are constantly changing the workforce and economic landscapes.

“One size doesn’t fit all” is a common saying among school choice supporters. But this is more than just a slogan. It’s an acknowledgement that children are unique and should have access to learning environments that work for them. Public policy is catching up to this understanding—six states have passed some version of a universal education savings account that will let parents fund multiple education options.

If you’ve considered taking the reins when it comes to your children’s education, it’s a great time to act on it. Whether you choose a full‐​time, in‐​person option, a hybrid schedule, or full homeschooling, you’ll be able to customize a learning plan that works best for your kids and your family. And you may even become an education entrepreneur yourself and end up with a fulfilling career that you never expected.