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Mustafa Akyol

At a time of bitter conflict in the Middle East, The Islamic Moses dives into the older, deeper, and often unexpectedly brighter story of Jews and Muslims.

Today, I am glad to announce the release of my latest book,

The Islamic Moses: How the Prophet Inspired Jews and Muslims to Flourish Together and Change the World (St. Martin’s Press, 2024)

It is, in a sense, a sequel to my earlier book, The Islamic Jesus (2017), which examined the Qur’anic depiction of Jesus Christ, revealing the intricate connections between Christianity and Islam. This time, I examine the Quranic depiction of Moses, who, curiously, is the most dominant human figure in the Islamic scripture, eclipsing even the latter’s own prophet, Muhammad.

The Quranic Moses is just the key to a much larger story, though. The Jewish prophet was so central to Islam’s founding text because he was the role model for Islam’s own prophet. Muhammad embraced the core ideals of Judaism — a staunch monotheism with a comprehensive religious law — only to proclaim them to his people, the Arabs. The theological continuation between two faiths was so strong that modern Jewish historian Shelomo Dov Goitein (d. 1985) defined Islam as “from the very flesh and bone of Judaism.” This new religion, Goitein added, was “a recast, an enlargement” of its Jewish precursor. 

For many people in the West today, all this may be surprising to hear, because they are used to hearing about the “Judeo-Christian tradition,” while Islam is often considered, at best, a distant cousin. But the Judeo-Christian tradition is a modern concept popularized only in the twentieth century, when Western civilization finally began to question its dark history of antisemitism, while parts of the Muslim world sadly began to absorb it.

However, there is an equally valid “Judeo-Islamic tradition” — as historian Bernard Lewis once called it — that encompasses both the striking religious parallels between Judaism and Islam, and also the deeply intertwined history of Jews and Muslims.

The Islamic Moses offers a theological and historical journey into this much-forgotten story.

The journey begins in Mecca with the book’s first chapter, “The Moses of Mecca.” Here we look into the very birth of Islam in early seventh-century Arabia, with Judaism being its “midwife,” as some modern Jewish historians saw it. We see why the Qur’an, especially in its Meccan chapters, narrates so much about Moses and his nemesis, the Pharaoh, with many parallels to the Hebrew Bible, but also with some fascinating nuances.

Then, in chapters 2 and 3, “What Really Happened in Medina (Parts I and II), we reexamine the first actual encounter between Jews and Muslims, which begins with a remarkably cordial and pluralist “constitution,” but ends up with grim stories of violence. We see, though, that beneath this seemingly religious conflict there could be more than meets the eye: the clash of the two great empires of the time, the Byzantines and the Sassanids, which strained the relations in peripheral Arabia.

In chapter 4, “Under the Kingdoms of Ishmael,” we see how the Judeo-Islamic tradition really began to take hold in history. As surprising as it may sound today, the early Islamic conquests, which built a huge empire from Spain to the borders of India in just a century, were often welcomed by Jews, if not assisted by them. The reason was not a “Jewish-Arabic cabal,” as some Christians believed then, but rather the simple fact that Jews found more freedom under Islam than elsewhere.

In chapter 5, “Halal Judaism, Kosher Islam,” we explore the “creative symbiosis” that took place between medieval Islam and Judaism, as some Jewish historians called it. The two religions, with remarkably similar beliefs and practices, learned a lot from each other, in intricate ways that may surprise many of their believers today.

In chapter 6, “How Islamic Rationalism Enriched Judaism,” we explore how some theological and philosophical trends that appeared in the golden age of Islam influenced the Jewish tradition in fascinating ways while, ironically, dwindling within Islam itself.

Chapter 7, “The Jewish Haskalah and the Islamic Enlightenment,” takes the readers to the modern world and examines how Jews, at the dawn of Western liberalism, reinterpreted their tradition with a new sense of individual liberty and religious freedom. We focus on Moses Mendelssohn, the greatest Jewish thinker of the eighteenth century, whose liberal ideas about the origins and values of Judaism are remarkably similar to the arguments of Islamic reformers of the more recent time.

Chapter 8, “The Good Orientalists,” challenges a cliché that has become all too popular in Muslim societies: “Orientalism,” or the study of Islam in the modern West, is built only on cynical motives that serve colonial interests. The truth is more complex, as evidenced especially by the much-forgotten Jewish Orientalists of nineteenth-century Germany. Their motivations toward Islam had nothing to do with colonialism or racial supremacism. Quite to the contrary, they had genuine sympathy for Islam, and even identified with it, while trying to find remedies in it against European antisemitism.

Chapter 9, “The Ottoman Haven,” reminds of the safety the Ottoman Turks, my ancestors, offered to Jews in their darkest hours, such as their expulsion from Spain in 1492, and the blood libels of the nineteenth century. In return, Jews were remarkably loyal to the Ottoman Empire until its very end in World War I — in stark contrast to latter-day myths about Jewish conspiracies that supposedly ended this last seat of the Islamic caliphate.

Finally, in the epilogue, “In the Darkest Hour,” we ponder whether the better history between Jews and Muslims is gone for good, as many would think today, especially in the darkness of the brutal conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, or whether there is a chance for peace and reconciliation.

The Islamic Moses, in other words, is not much about the modern conflict in the Middle East, which has built much tension and distrust between Muslims and Jews over the past three quarters of a century. Instead, it is about the much older, deeper, and often brighter story of Islam and Judaism, the remembrance of which, hopefully, can also help find a peaceful solution to that modern political tragedy. It can also help Muslims and Jews everywhere to look at each other with better understanding and deeper respect.

You can buy it on Ama​zon​.com, Barnes & Noble, or everywhere else in the United States where books are sold.

Praise for The Islamic Moses

“A timely, accessible, and eye-opening new approach to a centuries-old story.” — Kirkus, starred review

“Mustafa Akyol has written a genuinely valiant and profoundly knowledgeable book. His immersion in a tradition other than his own is moving to behold: an unforgettable example of humaneness across difference. I feel blessed to inhabit this ugly world with the author of this beautiful book.” — Leon Wieseltier

“Moses is the name that recurs most often in the Qur’an, and the Qur’an was just the beginning. Mustafa Akyol surprises again and yet again with one documented instance after another of affinity or alliance between Jews and Muslims over the centuries. Cogent, admirably concise, and thoroughly engaging.” — Jack Miles, Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Pulitzer-winning author of God: A Biography

“It is a rare thinker who can offer a critical comparative study of two religions and their interactions that is both honest and fair. Here you have it, and in a balanced presentation that is a delight to read.… A must-read for those open to sincere reflection.” — Rabbi Reuven Firestone, professor in medieval Judaism and Islam at Hebrew Union College

“This is a brilliant book that must be widely read by mainstream commentators and public figures as well as studied on campus[es]. It not only tells an important story but offers a key to peace in our troubled times.” — Akbar Ahmed, distinguished professor and the chair of Islamic studies at American University, former Pakistani High Commissioner

“A bold and original book.… Akyol’s path-breaking analysis gives us hope about better relations between Jews and Muslims in the future.” — Ahmet T. Kuru, professor at San Diego State University, author of Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment

“A piece of outstanding scholarship and an act of courage … Akyol tells us that Jews and Muslims are not condemned to a never-ending struggle. They can make appeal to a shared past and a common rationality.” — Martino Diez, associate professor of Arabic, Catholic University of Milan

“A magnificent act of writing [and] an urgently needed act of peace. I could not recommend The Islamic Moses with more enthusiasm. Or hope.” — Rev. Stephanie Dowrick, award-winning author and interfaith minister

Justin Logan

If there’s a lot of ruin in a nation, there can be a lot of BS in a poll. Although campaign veterans and political scientists have learned a lot about polling, many of those conducting polls, and certainly those publicizing their results, either don’t know or don’t care about polls’ limitations. Polls can contain truth, but they can also contain—or be used as—propaganda.

You don’t want to take poll caution all the way to poll nihilism, though. Take President Joe Biden, for example. In May, he pushed back against a CNN anchor who had asked about his consistently bad poll performances. His response? “The polling data has been wrong all along.” The polls won.

Or in 2012, a conservative activist founded a website called Unskewed Polls that asserted Mitt Romney actually was beating Barack Obama handily once you… well, unskewed the polls. When Obama trounced Romney, the activist protested that he had been right and that Obama won by committing “massive voter fraud in the key swing states.”

So with all that as prologue, here are a few comments on the recent poll Cato conducted under Emily Ekins’ stewardship. The defense and foreign policy studies group drew up a number of questions on foreign policy issues and surveyed voters in each of the likely vital swing states of Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Michigan. I wanted to point to three themes I identified in the poll.

First, casualty aversion. Our colleague John Mueller recently reprised his decades-old and pioneering argument that US support for war declines as US casualties increase. In his recent paper, Mueller argued that the GWOT was an aberration from that norm but we have returned to casualty aversion. (GWOT: Global War on Terrorism.) This poll supports that claim in the context of Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan.

For example, respondents supported “sending money and weapons to Ukraine.” As shown below, however, if asked whether they supported doing so “even if it risked going to war with Russia,” support sank significantly.

Much the same can be found in terms of a prospective Israel-Iran war. Sending money and guns to support Israel won far more support than did having the United States enter such a war itself.

Of note: A Chicago Council poll in August (after the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran) that asked whether respondents “would favor the use of US troops if Israel were attacked by its neighbors” saw numbers slightly less opposed to a US-Iran war, but still notably low: 42 percent would support US entry into such a war, whereas 56 percent would oppose.

But perhaps the most striking finding on this score concerned Taiwan. China is supposed to be the organizing principle of US defense policy, and there is profound support in Washington for defending Taiwan from Chinese predation. When asked what the United States should do if China were to invade Taiwan, Americans were willing to sanction or send aid, but only 8–9% said the United States should go to war with China to defend it. By contrast, 26–32% of respondents said the United States should “not get involved.”

Overall, Americans appear willing to throw lawyers, guns, and money at overseas problems, but are very wary of spilling American blood trying to remedy them.

This leads to the second theme I saw in the poll: an Iraq syndrome. In a Gallup poll earlier this year, I noticed that when asked an open-ended question about which country was our “greatest enemy today,” 5 percent had volunteered “the United States itself.” With that in mind, we asked respondents which countries posed a threat to US national security. Allowed to choose several options, 28–37% of respondents selected “the United States itself.” Pressed further about which of their threats posed the greatest threat to US national security, between 11–17% identified “the United States itself,” more than those who selected North Korea or Iran.

Of course, the finding raises the question of why voters see the United States itself as a threat to US national security. Here we have to allow an array of ideas: remorse about US adventures overseas; antipathy toward the opposing political party; Democrats seeing a threat to democracy and Republicans perceiving another Flight 93 election, and so on. But there is unquestionably a sense among many voters that America’s problems are coming from inside the house.

A sense of frustration clearly extends to US policy in the Middle East. When asked whether Washington could fix the problems happening in the Middle East if Americans devoted “more money, soldiers, and resources to conflicts” in that region, the results were absolutely dismal.

Similarly, asked whether our involvement in conflicts in the Middle East had done more to improve or worsen US national security, the responses were… not close.

The final theme, and here I’m saying what I always say, is the low salience of foreign policy. Asked to name their top three issues from a list of 17 possible, “foreign policy and national security” came in 9th, 10th, and 12th, respectively. Foreign policy in the United States is like polo—an elite sport. To change it, changing the elite will have more effect than trying to change mass opinion.

(Thank you to Ben Giltner, who created the charts for this blog.)

Jeffrey Miron

Most of the debate over COVID-19-inspired mask mandates addresses their alleged benefits, such as reduced illness and death; much less focuses on the potential costs.

New research, however, suggests the costs are significant: 

Our research … collected survey data from over 4,000 respondents in February 2022…. The survey … asked each respondent to report the amount of money they would be willing to pay to be exempt from a mask mandate for three months ….

Our results reveal that 56 percent of respondents would not be willing to pay any amount to be exempt from a three-month mask mandate, while the average amount that respondents would be willing to pay is $525. This suggests that a minority of the population perceive that wearing masks has a high cost.… Difficulty breathing was the top reason for not wanting to wear a mask, reported by 48 percent of respondents, followed by discomfort (45 percent), not being verbally understood (36 percent), and missing facial expressions (28 percent).

We used these estimates of respondents’ willingness to pay for an exemption to calculate the number of lives that would need to be saved for the benefits of a three-month, nationwide mask mandate to equal the mandate’s costs. … Our survey findings imply that a three-month masking order in the United States costs roughly $164 billion in 2022 dollars. Thus, a nationwide mask mandate would need to save 13,333 lives over a three-month period to be cost-effective.

Research on the public health benefits of masking presents mixed findings. Nonexperimental studies suggest that masking reduces COVID-19 infection rates by 70–80 percent. But controlled experimental studies suggest that masking does not reduce infection rates or leads to smaller reductions of 12 percent or less. If the estimations of larger reductions are correct, then a three-month nationwide mask mandate would have been cost-effective. However, if the estimations of smaller reductions are correct, then such a mandate would have had higher costs than benefits.

This uncertainty over the net value of mandates likely explains the backlash, vaccine hesitancy, and broader skepticism about public health guidance that emerged during COVID-19.

And this backlash constitutes a potentially high further cost of mandates: reduced take-up of other, useful vaccines. When an action like vaccination is beneficial, many people will do it without a mandate. When the case is less obvious, the risk of backlash is higher.

Thus, while infectious diseases generate externalities—which might imply a role for government—vaccine mandates generate their own externalities—backlash.

This article appeared on Substack on September 8, 2024.

Emily Ekins

A new Cato Institute survey of 1,500 Americans conducted by YouGov in the crucial swing states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin finds exhaustion with the current course of US foreign policy. Most say the US is “too involved” in world affairs and global conflicts (WI: 53%, PA: 50%, MI: 52%); majorities say US foreign policy does not put American interests first (WI: 62%, PA: 61%, MI: 60%); and majorities think it’s likely that the US is “closely” approaching World War III (WI: 59%, PA: 51%, MI: 54%).

The survey finds an especially close race between Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump, with Harris ahead of Trump in Wisconsin (51% to 46%), Trump slightly ahead of Harris in Michigan (48% to 47%), and the two candidates tied in Pennsylvania with 47% each among likely voters. Taking into consideration margins of error, the candidates are statistically tied in these three states.

With margins this close, public opinion on foreign policy could impact the election outcome. Indeed, slim majorities of likely voters in these three swing states say they are less likely to vote for a candidate who disagrees with them on foreign policy (WI: 52%, PA: 50%, MI: 52%).

Notably, the survey found voters trust Trump more than Harris to handle foreign policy by a margin of 4 percentage points in each state. They believe Trump is more likely to keep Americans out of foreign wars and conflicts (WI: 52%, PA: 51%, MI: 52%), to help end the war in Ukraine (WI: 51%, PA: 50%, MI: 54%), and make foreign policy decisions based on American interests first (WI: 51%, PA: 54%, MI: 56%).

But, these Rust Belt swing state voters also think Trump is more likely than Harris to get the U.S. into World War III (WI: 51%, PA: 51%, MI: 53%).

How could voters prefer Trump’s foreign policy but then worry he could instigate a global war? Voters may make a distinction between what a candidate says about policy and how they perceive that candidate’s judgment and impulsivity.

American Leadership in the World

Majorities of voters in these swing states would like the U.S. to play a “shared” leadership role in the world and global affairs (WI: 57%, PA: 53%, MI: 58%) rather than a dominant leadership role (WI: 38%, PA: 41%, MI: 32%). Few voters want the US to not play any leadership role at all (WI: 5%, PA: 6%, MI: 10%).

Interestingly, although Republicans are much more likely than Democrats to say the US is too involved in global affairs, they are also much more likely than Democrats to say the US should play the “dominant” leadership role in world affairs.

Europe

Majorities of swing state voters believe the war in Ukraine is important for US national security (WI: 65%, PA: 70%, MI: 71%). Pluralities also believe the country’s relationship with Ukraine strengthens the United States (WI: 43%, PA: 37%, MI: 40%). However, they are divided over US handling of the war (WI: 39%, PA: 41%, MI: 40% approve) and sending money and weapons to Ukraine (WI: 49%, PA: 45%, MI: 44% favor). After learning the US has sent Ukraine $170 billion in military aid and equipment, voters become more reluctant to send more. Instead, most want to reduce or stop the amount of aid sent going forward (WI: 50%, PA: 54%, MI: 57%).

Most believe that the war in Ukraine will lead to a broader war in Europe (WI: 59%, PA: 54%, MI: 63%), but most in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania think it’s unlikely that would pull in the United States (WI: 52%, PA: 55%). In Michigan, slightly more think America could get pulled into the war (53%). Nevertheless, Americans would oppose sending money and weapons to Ukraine if it risked getting the US into war.

NATO

Voters in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin have solidly favorable views of NATO (WI: 60%, PA: 56%, MI: 55%). And only a few Americans want to leave the organization (WI: 15%, PA: 13%, MI: 15%). Notably, nearly half of voters say the US should not continue to defend NATO member countries who fail to follow NATO’s rule that they contribute 2% of their GDP to defense (WI: 44%, PA: 52%, MI: 47%).

Swing state voters are more likely to agree that the US should stay in NATO because American involvement is essential to peace and stability in Europe (WI: 71%, PA: 74%, MI: 70%) than that the US should withdraw from NATO because the Europeans are freeriding on US defense (WI: 29%, PA: 26%, MI: 30%).

Middle East

Pluralities of these swing state voters believe that US involvement in the Middle East has done more to worsen America’s national security (WI: 47%, PA: 50%, MI: 49%). Even more, 8 in 10 swing state voters believe the US cannot fix the conflicts happening in the region even if the country devoted more money, soldiers, and resources.

Israel-Hamas War

Eight in 10 swing state voters say that the way Hamas carried out its attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, was unacceptable. However, voters are divided about the way Israel has carried out its response. Eight in 10 swing state voters support an immediate ceasefire in Gaza.

Seven in 10 believe that the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza is important to national security, and most believe the war could lead to a broader war in the Middle East (WI: 73%, PA: 77%, MI: 73%). If a broader war did break out, these voters would support sending military aid and equipment to Israel (WI: 51%, PA: 50%, MI: 44%) but not entering the war itself (WI: 53%, PA: 49%, MI: 48% opposed).

Asia

Majorities of voters in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania believe that US lawmakers pay too little attention to competition with China (WI: 54%, PA: 54%, MI: 62%). While few voters are “very familiar” with the tensions between China and Taiwan (WI: 24%, PA: 25%, MI: 21%), most believe it’s important to America’s national security (WI: 62%, PA: 65%, MI: 63%). If China prevented Taiwan from trading with other countries, about a quarter would want the US not to get involved, two-thirds would want to impose sanctions, and a fifth would send military aid to Taiwan, and only very few would support sending troops (WI: 2%, PA: 1%, MI: 3%). If China invaded Taiwan, about a quarter of voters still would not want to get involved, about half would want to impose sanctions, about a third would want to send money and equipment, and few would want to go to war (WI: 8%, PA: 8%, MI: 9%).

Mexico

Majorities of swing state voters support using military force to combat drug cartels in Mexico (WI: 55%, PA: 55%, MI: 51%). However, if the Mexican government opposed our involvement, then majorities would oppose sending US troops to combat drug cartels (WI: 67%, PA: 64%, MI: 63%).

Methodology

The Cato Institute 2024 Foreign Policy Swing State Survey was designed and conducted by the Cato Institute in collaboration with YouGov. YouGov collected responses of Americans in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin online August 15 — 23, 2024, from samples of 500 in each state. Restrictions are put in place to ensure that only the people selected and contacted by YouGov are allowed to participate. The margins of error are WI: +/- 5.07; PA: +/- 4.99; MI: +/- 5.03. Among likely voters it is WI: +/- 5.92, PA: +/- 5.93, MI: +/- 5.95 at the 95% level of confidence

The topline questionnaire and survey methodology can be found here (PDF) (XLS) and crosstabs can be found here (XLS). If you would like to speak to Dr. Ekins about the poll’s results please contact pr@​cato.​org or call 202–789‑5200.

Jennifer J. Schulp

American financial privacy has been in steady decline for more than 50 years. Regulatory frameworks, such as the Bank Secrecy Act and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Consolidated Audit Trail, establish government surveillance of Americans’ financial transactions. As financial services have become increasingly digitized—and as the thresholds for required reporting to the government have remained locked in time—the amount of financial records to which the government enjoys easy access has grown exponentially. And proposals for a central bank digital currency, which involve the government becoming more intimately involved in Americans’ use of money, have the potential to further erode the ability to transact without government surveillance.

There has been a flurry of recent congressional activity around financial privacy, including efforts to reform the Bank Secrecy Act, eliminate the collection of investors’ personal information in the Consolidated Audit Trail, and prohibit central bank digital currencies. Policymakers in both parties should focus on these important issues. Easy government access to financial data poses risks to everyone—not just those with something to hide.

Questions of financial privacy shouldn’t be shunted to the side.

Does financial convenience have to come at the cost of financial privacy? Does the Constitution provide the protections needed to limit government access to financial information? Can decentralization provide privacy-protecting solutions?

Join us on September 12 to consider these questions and more when Cato’s Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives hosts Financial Privacy under Fire: Protecting and Restoring Americans’ Rights. This conference will feature a fireside chat with House Financial Services Committee Chairman Patrick McHenry. It will also bring together experts and policymakers to discuss important questions about the state of financial privacy in the United States.

Our program includes:

9:30 — 9:35 AM: Opening Remarks by Norbert Michel, Vice President and Director, Cato’s Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives

9:35 — 10:45 AM: Panel Discussion on Financial Privacy and the Constitution

Morgan Cloud, Emory University School of Law
Stephen Henderson, University of Oklahoma College of Law
Rob Johnson, Institute for Justice
Jumana Musa, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
Brent Skorup, Legal Fellow, Cato’s Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies (moderator)

11:00 AM — 12:15 PM: Panel Discussion on Evaluating Central Bank Digital Currencies

Robert Bench, Radius
William Luther, Florida Atlantic University
Natalie Smolenski, Bitcoin Policy Institute
Jay Stanley, American Civil Liberties Union
Victoria Guida, Politico (moderator)

12:45 — 1:55 PM: Panel Discussion on Bank Secrecy Act Reform

Katherine Kirkpatrick Bos, StarkWare
Gregory Lisa, Hogan Lovells
Norbert Michel, Vice President and Director, Cato’s Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives
Lanier Saperstein, Dorsey & Whitney LLP
Claire Williams, American Banker (moderator)

2:00 — 2:30 PM: Fireside chat with Representative Patrick McHenry, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, moderated by Jennifer Schulp, Director of Financial Regulation Studies, Cato’s Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives

2:45 — 3:55 PM: Panel Discussion on Decentralization and Financial Privacy

Paul Brigner, Coinbase Institute
Ahmed Ghappour, Espresso Systems
Ian Miers, University of Maryland
Miller Whitehouse-Levine, DeFi Education Fund
Nikhilesh De, CoinDesk (moderator)

Register here to attend in person or online to join this important conversation.

Chris Edwards

Robert F. Kennedy Jr. writes in the Wall Street Journal that “Trump Can Make America Healthy Again.” I agree with Kennedy that some national health trends are disturbing. The share of US adults who are obese has risen from 15 percent in the late 1970s to 42 percent today.

Kennedy proposes some health system changes that I am not qualified to assess. But I approve of his proposals for food stamps and farm subsidies quoted here.

Stop allowing beneficiaries of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program to use their food stamps to buy soda or processed foods. Nine percent of all SNAP funding goes to sweetened drinks, according to 2011 data. It’s nonsensical for U.S. taxpayers to spend tens of billions of dollars subsidizing junk that harms the health of low-income Americans.

SNAP will cost taxpayers $105 billion this year, with almost 25 percent of the dollars going toward junk food, including soda, candy, potato chips, cookies, and ice cream. Those subsidies are absurd given the explosion in obesity and the government’s large budget deficits.

Low-income individuals have higher obesity rates than other Americans, and SNAP recipients have higher obesity rates than low-income individuals not on the program. The “N” in SNAP is a government falsehood.

The best reform would be to repeal SNAP and allow the states to pursue their own low-income food policies. But regarding Kennedy’s proposal, I’d suggest simply giving the states waivers allowing them to cut out any foods they want from their SNAP programs. The federal government has denied such waivers in the past.

Reform crop subsidies. They make corn, soybeans and wheat artificially cheap, so those crops end up in many processed forms. Soybean oil in the 1990s became a major source of American calories, and high-fructose corn syrup is everywhere. Our subsidy program is so backward that less than 2% of farm subsidies go to fruits and vegetables.

Crop subsidies should be repealed because they burden taxpayers and distort agriculture. Kennedy is right that fruits and vegetables receive few subsidies, and neither does ranching. But the lesson is not that subsidies for crops should be reallocated to other products, but that most American farming prospers without subsidies. There is no reason to coddle corn, wheat, and soybean farmers when other farmers stand proudly on their own two feet.

More on SNAP here.

More on farm subsidies here.

Colleen Hroncich

In early 2018, I received an email from our local Christian academy with “Exciting Opportunity” in the subject line. “We are excited to introduce you to a refreshing new development in classical Christian education: the Classic Learning Test (CLT),” the email began. At the time, according to the email, the test was accepted by nearly 90 colleges and universities.

That fall, my daughter took the Classic Learning Test as she was applying to colleges. Little did we know how the CLT would take off in the coming years. It is now accepted by more than 250 colleges and universities for admissions and scholarships.

The Classic Learning Test features readings from classic literature and historical texts that have shaped Western culture. The test was created in 2015 by a teacher, Jeremy Tate, who had learned to appreciate classical education despite not growing up with it. “I first discovered classical literature when I was living in a tent in Alaska in 2001. I had no other form of entertainment and spent countless hours reading the works of Russian author Fyodor Dostoevsky,” he recalls. “After graduating from LSU I went to Reformed Theological Seminary (RTS) where I was more fully immersed in the classical tradition. The formation I received at RTS shaped my vision for education and profoundly inspired the launching of the Classic Learning Test.”

In 2013, while teaching evening classes to eleventh-grade students who had failed English, Jeremy looked through the materials and realized why the students were bored and disconnected. He completely re-vamped the class, getting rid of the textbooks and buying the students copies of Flannery O’Connor’s short stories. Each evening, they formed a circle, read out loud, and paused when anyone wanted to discuss the reading. It completely changed the dynamics of the class—students who previously were completely uninterested in the material became enthusiastic when they were given readings that delved into topics like religion, philosophy, ethics, or the nature of good and evil.

Jeremy realized he was on to something. He recognized that the SAT and ACT had become the drivers for most high school curricula, so he decided to create an alternative test that would help revitalize education. The CEO of the College Board, which produces the SAT, has acknowledged that “teachers will teach towards the test. There is no force on this earth strong enough to prevent that.” Given that, the CLT website notes, “Shouldn’t those tests engage students with the thinkers and writings that have most meaningfully shaped our culture for the past two millennia?”

CLT exams emphasize critical thinking and problem-solving to help parents and teachers evaluate their students. The tests include Verbal Reasoning (textual comprehension and analysis), Grammar/​Writing (textual editing and improvement), and Quantitative Reasoning (logic and mathematics). Exam results include an analytics report that explains the student’s outcome and performance.

The main CLT is for high school juniors and seniors and serves as an alternative to the SAT and ACT for admission to hundreds of colleges. The CLT10 is aimed at ninth- and tenth-grade students, similar to the PSAT. For younger kids, the CLT3‑8 exams assess language arts and mathematics to track student growth and abilities. Students can take the tests at schools or by being remotely proctored at home. There are test dates offered throughout the year, and students can test multiple times to try to improve their score.

Recent years have seen a resurgence in classical learning. The Friday Feature has profiled many classical educational entities, including public and private schools, full- and part-time programs, homeschool co-ops, and organizations that help support classical education. The CLT has played a big role in that revival by giving schools and families a more fitting way to evaluate and track the results of their efforts.

Jeremy has said that one of the goals of CLT is to help revitalize American education. To further that goal, his staff works to get the CLT accepted by states that have testing requirements for homeschoolers or students who participate in school choice programs, such as education savings accounts. The CLT website includes a map that shows which states have homeschool testing requirements and which of those accept CLT for that requirement. There’s also a page that lists which state school choice programs partner with CLT.

There are many successes that Jeremy could point to when he evaluates how far CLT has come, but he’s quick to say what tops the list. “The most rewarding aspect of the CLT journey has been meeting the young people who are receiving this kind of education,” he explains. “Truly, the best argument for classical education is found in the character of the young people who are receiving this kind of education. They are truly amazing and CLT is blessed to employ many of them.”

Jeffrey A. Singer

In a blog post earlier this year, I lamented the decision by Oregon lawmakers to roll back Measure 110, a ballot proposition that Oregon voters passed in November 2020 decriminalizing drug use and possession while expanding access to harm reduction and addiction treatment services.

Measure 110 went into effect in February 2021, when COVID-19 pandemic policies and bureaucratic delays blocked harm reduction and treatment services. Complicating matters further, fentanyl, which had been making its way in an east-to-west wave across the country, arrived in the Pacific Northwest around 2019–2020, causing a spike in opioid-related overdoses similar to the spikes seen in every other region when fentanyl entered the drug supply. ( By 2018, almost 90 percent of overdose deaths involving fentanyl and its analogs occurred in 28 states east of the Mississippi River.) These factors combined to create a “perfect storm,” leading Oregon policymakers to believe Measure 110 was responsible for the increase in overdose deaths.

With the law in effect only two years, and with the expansion of harm reduction and treatment services begun only eight months earlier, Oregon lawmakers re-criminalized drug possession. Pundits supporting drug prohibition were quick to point to Oregon as an argument against decriminalization.

Today, researchers from Brown University and RTI International published new research in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) that analyzed the association between fatal overdose and the enactment of Measure 110. The researchers conducted a cohort study using a “matrix completion synthetic control method.” The 48 states and the District of Columbia that had not decriminalized drugs served as the control. The researchers assessed the prevalence of fentanyl in unregulated drug markets by analyzing the percentage of state-level drug samples reported to the National Forensic Laboratory Information System and identified as fentanyl or its analog. They obtained mortality data from January 1, 2008, to December 31, 2022, from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The primary outcome they assessed was fatal overdose rates per half-year. They used a changepoint analysis—a statistical technique that detects points in a data series where the properties or underlying patterns change—to determine when the fentanyl wave hit each state. Their findings:

After adjusting for the spread of fentanyl as a confounder, the effect size changed signs (estimate [SE], −0.51 [0.61]; P = .41) and there was no longer an association between decriminalization and overdose mortality in Oregon.

The researchers’ conclusion:

In this cohort study of fatal drug overdose and the spread of fentanyl through Oregon’s unregulated drug market, no association between M110 and fatal overdose rates was observed. Future evaluations of the health effects of drug policies should account for changes in the composition of unregulated drug markets.

There is now empirical evidence showing decriminalization critics and Oregon lawmakers too quickly abandoned Oregon’s “experiment” with decriminalization combined with increased access to harm reduction and treatment. Will the critics examine this new evidence?

Alas, it may be too late. All the bad publicity hoisted unjustly on Oregon’s short-lived attempt at drug policy reform has set back similar reforms in other parts of the country.

Adam N. Michel and Josh Loucks

Vice President Kamala Harris recently announced a new proposal to expand the tax deduction for start-up costs for small businesses from $5,000 to $50,000. Without the immediate deduction, the deduction of start-up costs must be spread out over 15 years. The Harris proposal allows us to dig deeper into the various business expenses that can’t be fully deducted and to demonstrate how delayed deductions hurt business growth.

A deduction delayed is a deduction partially denied because time and inflation erode the value of the write-off years later. Under the normal tax system, a $100 investment deduction that must be incrementally used over 15 years is only worth about $74 to the business in present value (assuming 2 percent inflation). Fifteen years of waiting erodes a quarter of the deduction’s value to the business, which increases the after-tax cost of investing. When costs rise, investment falls.

This problem is even worse for investments in residential buildings and other structures. These longer-lived investments must be depreciated or deducted over 27.5 years and 39 years, respectively. At 2 percent inflation, the present value of the deduction for an investment in a structure is cut in half.

Fixing this problem of waiting to recoup the cost of new investments, particularly for structures, could be the most important change to the tax code to boost investment and economic growth.

For a timely example of one way to even out the tax treatment of some business investments, consider legislation recently reintroduced by Sen. Mike Braun (R‑IN) and Rep. Kevin Hern (R‑OK) (S. 4924 and H.R. 9069). The proposed modification would shorten the depreciation schedules for structures to 20 years and allow the remaining deductions to be indexed for inflation and the time value of money. This system is often called neutral cost recovery.

According to a Tax Foundation analysis of a similar proposal from 2022, the changes would reduce revenue by $187 billion on a static basis over 10 years. However, the reform is projected to boost long-run gross domestic product by 1.2 percent, increase capital stock by 2.3 percent, and expand employment by 230,000 jobs. When scored dynamically to account for the larger economy, the bill is projected to increase federal revenue by roughly $127 billion over 10 years. Neutral cost recovery is a tax cut that more than pays for itself.

This neutral cost recovery proposal is one of three critical pieces to fix the tax code’s broken treatment of business investments. Congress should allow full immediate deductions (called full expensing) for all short-lived assets (20 years or less). This policy was temporarily included in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, but it began to phase out in 2023 and will return to the normal depreciation system after 2027. All other costs, including research spending and all start-up costs (not just $50,000), should also be eligible for immediate deduction.

Although full expensing is also the proper treatment for investments in structures, it comes at a high cost of about $413 billion over the budget window (conventionally scored). Neutral cost recovery delivers a similar economic benefit as full expensing with a smaller reduction in revenue, albeit without some of the simplification benefits that come with full expensing. Either way, both treatments help reduce the after-tax cost of investing in structures compared with the current system.

Shifting away from the current depreciation rules toward full investment deductions is a more economically neutral treatment for business investment and, thus, creates a powerful incentive for new capital spending and domestic construction. Higher investment and productivity growth also lead to wage gains and new employment opportunities.

Many of the issues that Harris is campaigning on—such as housing affordability, manufacturing, transportation infrastructure, and domestic semiconductor production—would benefit from full immediate deductions for expenses, whether they be start-up costs, research spending, or new building construction. Full expensing removes current disincentives to expand existing businesses or build new ones.

Washington often relies on regulations, subsidies, and trade barriers to “help” American businesses compete. These market-distorting interventions do more harm than good. The Harris proposal to expand immediate business write-offs is a small example of a way to reduce existing tax disincentives to doing business in America. Extending similar treatment to all investments and keeping business tax rates low—something Harris is not proposing—would level the playing field between types of investments, expand investment opportunities, and drive widely shared employment growth and wage gains.

Romina Boccia and Ivane Nachkebia

How does Social Security compare to other countries’ retirement programs? It’s an interesting question that prompted me to organize a symposium with international experts at the Cato Institute earlier this year. In a recent Washington Post article, Julie Zauzmer Weil asks a similar question but misses the mark on several fronts.

Weil provides a compelling analysis of Social Security, emphasizing the program’s below-average replacement rate compared to other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. While the article raises valid concerns, it overlooks several points that paint a more nuanced picture of the US retirement system—most importantly, how much less dependent Americans are on government for their retirement income.

The article fails to acknowledge the total replacement rate of the US retirement system, which includes both Social Security and voluntary pensions. When considering this broader perspective, the US approach replaces more than 73 percent of pre-retirement earnings for average workers, significantly higher than the OECD average of 55.3 percent. This places the United States ahead of many countries, including some with more robust government-run systems.

For example, the article shows that French public pensions replace 57.6 percent of pre-retirement earnings of an average worker, compared to Social Security’s 39.1 percent replacement rate. (As mentioned, when voluntary pensions are included, the total replacement rate for the US retirement system exceeds 73 percent.) On the other hand, the French system remains at 57.6 percent due to the limited coverage of voluntary pensions, so low that the OECD does not factor them into total replacement rate calculations. OECD data also highlight that American seniors are far less dependent on government for their retirement income compared to their French counterparts. Public benefits make up 39.3 percent of American seniors’ total income, while in France, they account for 78.1 percent.

The higher income replacement rate in the United States is largely due to the strength of voluntary pension plans like 401(k)s and IRAs, which play a key role in supplementing Social Security benefits. The program was never intended to be most workers’ sole source of income in retirement but rather a backstop to keeping seniors out of poverty.

Importantly, income from private savings and investments is income that Americans fully own, whereas beneficiaries have no property rights to their Social Security benefits. Congress can change benefit policies at any time. (See my recent piece “Five Reasons Why Social Security Is an Income Transfer Program, Not an ‘Earned Benefit.’”)

Weil acknowledges that Americans rely more heavily on private pensions and savings, and she argues that not all workers have access to these savings, making across-the-board benefit cuts undesirable. However, this argument misses a critical point. Proponents of Social Security reform, including myself, do not advocate for across-the-board cuts. Instead, we support a more nuanced approach: focusing government benefits on low earners who are less likely to have significant private savings and reducing benefits for high earners who typically have substantial 401(k) assets and other retirement savings. This targeted approach would better align Social Security with its original goal of providing a safety net for those most in need.

A good example of a more targeted system that the United States should consider emulating is New Zealand’s Superannuation (NZS) program. New Zealand’s government-provided retirement benefits focus on eliminating poverty among the elderly, ensuring that all eligible retirees have a basic level of income security. To complement the government benefit, New Zealand offers the KiwiSaver program, which provides some incentives and makes it easy for people to save for their retirement in accounts they own and control. This targeted approach could serve as a model for the United States as we consider reforms to our Social Security system.

Additionally, while Weil acknowledges that poorer workers often lack access to 401(k)s and IRAs, this overstates the problem. It also fails to explore potential solutions. First, lacking access to 401(k)s or IRAs does not mean that Americans aren’t saving for retirement. According to the Federal Reserve, 88 percent of Americans who are 60 and older have retirement savings, when you include a broader set of income sources such as business and rental income and savings in other accounts. Second, one promising idea is the establishment of universal savings accounts (USAs). Unlike current retirement savings vehicles, USAs would be accessible to all workers and would lack the complex rules that often deter low-income workers from participating in 401(k)s and IRAs. Being able to access account funds without paying a hefty tax penalty is particularly important to younger and lower wage workers who may need to tap into their savings earlier, whether to cover an emergency or invest in their future through education or by building a business. By creating a more inclusive and flexible savings system, policymakers can help bridge the gap for those who are currently underserved by both Social Security and private employer–provided pensions.

In summary, while the Washington Post article sheds light on key aspects of the US retirement system, it overlooks the strengths of our voluntary retirement savings system, fails to acknowledge how targeted reforms could better protect vulnerable seniors, and misses an opportunity to explore innovative solutions like USAs, which would address the specific needs of low-income workers.

A more targeted approach to Social Security reform, one that focuses government benefits on those who need them most and scales back benefits for those with higher earnings—who have the ability to save for more of their retirement needs in ways they own and control—would better serve the diverse needs of American retirees while protecting younger workers from higher taxes and all Social Security beneficiaries from automatic benefit cuts.

We can learn a lot from how other countries manage their retirement programs, including how policymakers have addressed similar demographic and economic changes that the United States faces. As Jason Fichtner, one of the experts at our Cato Social Security Symposium, stated, “We need to think about this holistically as a retirement ecosystem and where income is coming from.” He’s right. We should avoid missing the retirement income forest by focusing primarily on the government benefit trees.

Following the May 2024 Cato Institute Social Security Symposium: A Global Perspective, we’re now working on a book that will compare the five featured countries (the United States, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, and Sweden) across several dimensions and will share insights and perspectives from the symposium in a forthcoming volume to be published next year. In the meantime, you can watch video from the symposium.