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Economy

A couple months ago, in arguing that “The Fed should give everyone a bank account,” journalist Matt Yglesias cited what he took to be an instructive precedent: “Once upon a time, governments didn’t issue paper currency, and instead banknotes were printed privately by banks. But over time, we came to see this as a worthwhile public service.” His first sentence is certainly correct. Banknotes were redeemable paper claims on the issuing banks, which circulated as currency. Systems of freely competitive note-issue worked quite well, as in Canada and Scotland, with the notes of different banks trading at par against one another.

But what to make of his second sentence? I take it to mean that governments now issue paper currency because “we” learned that it is beneficial for governments to do so, rather than (or along with) private banks. Both the origin story and the evaluation are dubious. Yglesias seems to have consulted his imagination rather than the historical record about how governments came to provide paper currency. Getting that history straight was not the point of his piece, so his casual narrative may be forgiven. But for those who do want to get it straight, the story of how the Federal Reserve System of the United States was authorized to issue banknotes, and how private U.S. banks were de-authorized, may be of interest.

On the evaluative question, it should be noted that private banknotes still predominate today in the few places where their issue remains legal: Scotland, Northern Ireland, Hong Kong, and Macau. There is no compelling efficiency rationale for government provision (much less exclusive provision) of paper currency.

Before the Federal Reserve Act

Private commercial banks issued banknotes in the United States from 1781 up to 1935, with only occasional governmental and semi-governmental issues. Before the Civil War there were two federally chartered note-issuing banks, namely the first and second Banks of the United States (1791-1811 and 1816-36). Congress owned one-fifth of their initial share capital, but their notes were not obligations of the federal government. The governments of Kentucky and Vermont owned banks. Otherwise, all paper currency notes were the obligations of private institutions, even when state governments held minority shares.[1] Finally, during the Civil War, the federal government issued “greenbacks,” or United States Notes. These were not banknotes but legal-tender obligations of the U.S. Treasury, and they were not payable in gold (the nation’s metallic standard before and after the war) until 1879.

A long-lasting change in the legal rules for private note-issue came in the National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864, and a further Act of 1866. The National Banking Acts authorized federal charters for note-issuing banks (called “National Banks” although they could not branch interstate). The charters linked the right of note issue to a National Bank’s purchase of eligible federal bonds. This requirement was a device to sell federal war bonds to the federally chartered banks, inspired by similar requirements that many state governments had instituted to sell their own bonds to state-chartered banks. These were called “bond-collateral” requirements because if a bank failed, the bonds would be sold to reimburse customers holding its banknotes. Initially a National Bank could issue notes up to 90% of the par value of the eligible bonds it held; after 1900 it could issue up to 100%.

The Act of 1866 imposed a deliberately prohibitive tax on banknotes issued by state-chartered banks—a tax high enough to drive them out of the note-issuing business. The tax was upheld by the Supreme Court in Veazie Bank v. Fenno (1869). Only National Banks thereafter issued banknotes, and only on terms dictated by the federal government.

The bond-collateral requirement on National Banks had an unintended consequence: it made the quantity of banknotes in circulation inflexible or “inelastic,” unable to vary to meet seasonal or cyclical variation in the public’s desired mix of banknotes and deposits. Inelasticity was a major factor in causing the five U.S. banking panics of the National Banking era. The Canadian banking system during the same era, by contrast, had no bond-collateral requirement on banknotes, no seasonal spike in interest rates at crop-moving time, and no financial panics.

The U.S. system could have avoided panics by adopting Canadian-style reforms: removing bond collateral requirements and allowing nationwide branch banking. Note-issue would have stayed a private business. But this solution was a political non-starter: The thousands of small state-chartered banks wouldn’t stand for the competition that liberalization of branching would bring.[2]

Enter the Fed, and Exit National Bank Notes

Instead, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was passed to, as its preamble says, “provide a more elastic currency.” National Bank Notes would remain in circulation, and their volume would remain tied to the volume of available federal bonds eligible to serve as collateral, but Federal Reserve Notes would provide elasticity to the total stock of currency by varying as necessary to meet variations in demand for banknotes. Note-issue by a government agency was a “worthwhile public service” only in a second-best sense, private note-issue having been hobbled by legal restrictions that rendered its supply inelastic. In Canada, with no inelasticity problem and no panics, there was no case for a central bank in 1913.

The figure below shows the volume of National Bank Notes in circulation between 1914 and 1935, together with the volume of Federal Reserve Notes. The Federal Reserve Act authorized the Fed to replace National Bank Notes in circulation with Federal Reserve Notes, by purchasing the eligible bonds from any National Banks that decided to retire from note-issue. Only a few did. The public did not show any preference for Federal Reserve Notes. The volume of National Bank Notes dropped about 30 percent in 1914-16. Between 1916 and 1932 the volume of National Bank Notes was rather steady. In 1932 the volume of paper currency in circulation was about 20 percent National Bank Notes (about $650 million), and about 80 percent Federal Reserve Notes (about $2600 million). National Bank Notes bulged in 1932-34 with the passage of legislation that expanded the range of eligible collateral to include higher-yielding bonds.

The coexistence of Federal Reserve Notes and National Bank Notes ended after 1935. What ended private note-issue was a further tightening of the noose of legal restrictions. As of 1930, the Treasury bonds that bore the “circulation privilege” were callable. On August 1, 1935, the U.S. Treasury, following an executive order given  by President Franklin Roosevelt that March, called in and retired all of the bonds that bore the circulation privilege. National Banks then held $658 million of such bonds as collateral against their $658 million of notes in circulation. With the required bonds unavailable, National Banks lost the right to issue. The Federal Reserve paid par value for the bonds in its own liabilities, allowing the banks to recall and redeem their banknotes by paying their customers with Federal Reserve Notes.

An article in the Indianapolis Times on the 11th of March 1935 about the plan to retire National Bank Notes was appropriately headlined: “U. S. to Take Control over All Currency.” Treasury officials rationalized the measure as giving the federal government greater power over the monetary system, as though a more centralized system were ipso facto better: “Government officials said the move was another step in the simplification of the monetary system and a vesting of complete power in the hands of the Federal government. Previously, national banks have been permit[ted] to issue their money independent of whether or not it was needed in circulation and sometimes in conflict with other monetary steps of the government.” The supposed conflict was not specified. No conflict is evident in the figure, showing hardly any variation in the volume of National Bank Notes between 1916 and 1932.

The imagined benefits of centralized control rested on wishful thinking. Few economic historians today would give a passing grade to the Federal Reserve’s conduct of monetary policy in the decade before or in the decade after 1935. The Fed’s post-Depression performance has also left a lot to be desired, but not for lack of control over the currency.

 

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[1] See Susan Hoffman, Politics and Banking: Ideas, Public Policy, and the Creation of Financial Institutions (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), pp. 75-76.

[2] George A. Selgin and Lawrence H. White, “Monetary Reform and the Redemption of National Bank Notes, 1863-1913,” Business History Review 68 (Summer 1994), pp. 205-43.

The post How U.S. Government Paper Currency Began, and How Private Banknotes Ended appeared first on Alt-M.

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Yoram Bauman: 

This is the fifth such review I’ve been involved in and it is almost certainly the last review I’ll be doing, for the simple reason that the vast majority of textbooks now have excellent content on climate change! (If desired you can skip directly to the report card, or read on for some context and big-picture thoughts.)

The state of affairs today is very different from that of 10 years ago—my previous reviews were in 201020122014, and 2017—much less 20 years ago, when I had an astonishing and hilarious email exchange with University of Houston professors Roy Ruffin and Paul Gregory about the wacky climate-skeptic claims (“no matter how much contrary evidence is presented, it just doesn’t matter”) in their now-defunct textbook.

In past years I have given out a Ruffin and Gregory Award for the Worst Treatment of Climate Change in an Economics Textbook, and I am pleased to say that no book merits that award this year

This is good news … the economics profession won’t be participating (as much) in the training of undergraduates in climate skepticism.

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DMT (2020) draw attention to my treatment of the weighted WTP estimates. The regression model for the second scenario has a negative sign for the constant and a positive sign for the slope. When I “mechanically” calculate WTP for the second scenario it is a positive number which adds weight to the sum of the WTP parts. This is in contrast to the unweighted data for which WTP is negative. Inclusion of the data from this scenario biases the adding-up tests in favor of the conclusion that the WTP data does not pass the adding-up test. 

The motivation for my consideration of the weighted data was DMT’s (2015) claim that they found similar results with the weighted data. My analysis uncovered validity problems with two of the five scenarios which, when included in a adding-up test, led to a failure to reject adding-up. At this point in the conversation it will be instructive to visually examine the weighted data to see if it even passes the “laugh” test. In my opinion, it doesn’t. 

Below are the weighted votes and theTurnbull for the whole scenario (note that the weights are scaled to equal to sub-sample sizes). The dots and dotted lines represent the raw data. Instead of a downward slope, these data are “roller-coaster” shaped (two scary hills with a smooth ride home). The linear probability model (with weighted data) has a constant equal to 0.54 (t=9.73) and a slope equal to -0.00017 (t=-0.69). This suggests to me that the whole scenario data, once weighted, lacks validity. While lacking validity, the solid line Turnbull illustrates how a researcher can obtain a WTP estimate with data that does not conform to rational choice theory. The Turnbull smooths the data over the invalid stretches of the bid curve (the “non-monoticities” using the CVM jargon) and the WTP estimate is the area of the rectangles. In this case WTP = $191 which is very close to the unweighted Turnbull estimate. But, a researcher should consider this estimate questionable since the underlying data does not conform to theory. As a reminder, the WTP for the whole scenario is key to the adding up test as it is compared to the sum of the parts. The WTP estimate from linear logit model is $239 with the Delta Method [-252, 731] and Krinsky-Robb [-8938, 9615] confidence intervals. Given the statistical uncertainty of the WTP estimate, it is impossible to conduct any sort of hypothesis test with these data. 

Below are the weighted votes and the (pooled) Turnbull for the second scenario. The dots and dotted lines represent the raw data. Instead of a downward slope, these data are “Nike swoosh” shaped. The linear probability model (with weighted data) has a constant equal to 0.13 (t=2.46) and a slope equal to 0.00107 (t=4.19). This suggests to me that the second scenario data, once weighted, lacks validity. Again, the Turnbull estimator masks the weakness of the underlying data. In this case, the Turnbull is essentially a single rectangle. With pooling the probability of a vote in favor is equal to 28.06% for the lower bid amounts. With pooling the probability is 27.56% for the higher bids. The Turnbull WTP estimate is $112 which appears to be a reasonable number, hiding the problems with the underlying data. 

DMT reestimated the full data model with the cost coefficients constrained to be equal. In a utility difference model the cost coefficient is the estimate for the marginal utility of income. There is no reason for marginal utility of income to vary across treatments unless the clean-up scenarios and income are substitutes or complements. This theoretical understanding does not explain why the weighted models for the whole and second scenarios are not internally valid (i.e., the cost coefficient is not negative and statistically different from zero). The model that DMT refer to passes a statistical test, i.e., the model that constains the cost coefficient to be equal is not worse statistically than an unconstrained model, but it should be considered inappropriate due to the lack of validity in the weighted whole and second scenario data sets. Use of the model with a constrained cost coefficient amounts to hiding a poor result. The reason that the weighted model with the full data set takes the correct sign is because the scenarios with correct signs outweigh the scenarios with incorrect or statistically insignificant signs. The reader should attach little import to DMT’s (2015) claim that their result is robust to the use of sample weights. 

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